Biclique cryptanalysis is a typical attack through finding a biclique which is a type of bipartite diagram to reduce the computational complexity. By investigating the subkey distribution and the encryption structure, we find out a weakness in the key schedule of Piccolo-80. A 6-round biclique is constructed for Piccolo-80 and a 7-round biclique for Piccolo-128. Then a full round biclique cryptanalysis of Piccolo is presented. The results of the attacks are with data complexity of 2 40 and 2 24 chosen ciphertexts and with computational complexity of 2 79.22 and 2 127.14 , respectively. They are superior to other known results of biclique cryptanalytic on Piccolo.
Introduction
In ASIACRYPT 2011, Bogdanov et al. proposed a biclique on recovering the keys of the full AES-128/192/256 [1] , which is a type of meet-in-the-middle attack and the recent cryptanalysis technique of block ciphers. In [1] , they gave two techniques by constructing bicliques for AES. One is the independent related-key differentials biclique and the other is the long biclique. Soon after the paper was published, a great deal of cryptanalytical results on the other block ciphers were suggested.
The crucial issue of the technology is to construct a superior biclique structure at the ciphertext (or plaintext). In a biclique, one top set comprises 2 1 ciphertexts (or plaintexts) while the other set is composed of 2 2 intermediate states. If 1 = 2 = , the biclique structure is called a d-dimension ( = 1 = 2 = 8 in this paper). In some constrained environments, for example, RFID tags or sensor nodes, the size of the secret key is typically 64, 80, or 128 bits. A lot of attacks on lightweight block cipher by using biclique have been published, such as Piccolo [2] , IDEA [3] , HIGHT [4, 5] , LED [6] , PRESENT [7, 8] , TWINE [9, 10] , and KLEIN [11] .
The meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a representative method which is used in the security evaluation of block cipher, and its exceptional property is only a minimal data complexity. In recent years, many varieties emerged, for example, 3-subset MITM [12] . Many methods carry out the preimage attack to the hash function [13] and they consist of spice-and-cut frame and partial matching and so forth. Using the key expansion algorithm, opponent can construct a structure and pick out wrong keys through partial matching, which is the important idea of the method.
Piccolo is a 64-bit block cipher. In accordance with the different length of the key, we signify the ciphers by Piccolo-80/128, respectively [14] . In ISPEC 2012, Wang et al. presented a biclique attack on reduced round Piccolo [2] . They attacked a 25-round Piccolo-80 with 2 48 chosen plaintexts and 2 78.95 computations. In the case of a 28-round Piccolo-128, this attack required 2 24 chosen plaintexts and 2
126.79 computations. However, the authors considered Piccolo-80 without the postwhitening key and Piccolo-128 without the prewhitening key. In [5] , Song et al. proposed a full round biclique cryptanalysis on Piccolo-80 demanding 2 48 chosen plaintexts and 2 79.34 computations and on Piccolo-128 requiring 2 24 chosen plaintexts and 2 127.36 computations. In [15] , we find two faults which are detailed in Section 4.1 in this paper. Compared to these results, ours are superior to theirs. In this paper, we detect a weakness in the key schedule on Piccolo-80; that is, the round key rk 47 can offset the postwhitening key partially. Based on this, the data complexity can be decreased greatly. We apply some observations on Piccolo in [16] and construct an independent related-key differentials biclique for the last several rounds. Then an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 6 rounds is constructed for Piccolo-80 and an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 7 rounds for Piccolo-128. The attacks are, respectively, with data complexity of 2 40 and 2 24 , and with computational complexity of 2 79.22 and 2 127.14 , which are the best results currently. The attack results on Piccolo are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 .
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the structures of Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128. Section 3 introduces briefly biclique cryptanalysis. Then, Section 4 presents the cryptanalysis with an 8-dimensional biclique of 6 rounds on full round Piccolo-80 and with a biclique structure of 7 rounds on full round Piccolo-128. The data complexity and computational complexity on Piccolo-80 and Piccolo-128 are given, respectively. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section 5.
Piccolo Specifications

Notations
⊕: bit-wise exclusive or (XOR).
: iterative rounds. ‖: concatenation.
[ ]: the th 16-bit group of the key (0 ≤ ≤ 4 for Piccolo-80, 0 ≤ ≤ 7 for Piccolo-128).
WK : the 16-bit whitening key (0 ≤ ≤ 3). , (64): the th and th byte of the state after FFunction in th round.
Description of Piccolo.
The structure of Piccolo is a variation of generalized Feistel, as shown in Figure 1 . Piccolo-80/128 supports 80-bit and 128-bit key sizes along with 25 and 31 rounds, respectively.
The detailed descriptions of Piccolo are in [14] , and each round of Piccolo consists of the following 3 steps:
16 → {0, 1} 16 being composed of two S-box layers and a diffusion matrix M. 
For Piccolo-128, the distribution of subkey is similar to that of Piccolo-80. The 128-bit master key is denoted by
. The whitening keys and 31-round subkey are computed as follows:
The specific subkeys of Piccolo-80/128 are illustrated in Table 3 . 
Biclique Attack on Piccolo
The 3-
To avoid duplication, we do not explicate the detailed attack basis but three stages of the attack are described in more detail. (Table 3) , an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 6 rounds is constructed by each right half of [4] and [2] , that is, [4] and [2] . We find [4] of the round key rk 47 can offset [4] of the postwhitening key, so it can decrease the data complexity greatly. By calculation, the computational complexity is optimal so far.
Biclique Cryptanalysis of
The
, and [ , ] of each group are depicted, as shown below:
where ∈ {0, 1} 8 , = 0 00,
where ∈ {0, 1} 8 , 
Finally,
Thus, the space of is divided into 2 64 groups of 2 16 keys each.
Phase 2: 8-Dimensional Biclique Structure of 6 Rounds.
We construct an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 6 rounds for Piccolo-80 with whitening keys for each group (Figure 2 Step 1. Let 0 = 0 (64) and decrypt 0 for 6 rounds to obtain
The procedure is named basic calculation.
Step 2. In order to get the corresponding ciphertext , encrypt 0 using different keys [ ,0] for ∈ {0,1} 8 ( Figure 2(c) ). The differences between [ ,0] and [0, 0] can lead to the gray intermediate states' differences and cause the computational complexity. The gray intermediate states need to be computed 2 8 − 1 times, whereas the remaining states are calculated just once because they have been already computed in Step 1. This step derives ( 0 )
Step 3. To get the corresponding states , decrypt 0 using different keys [0, ] for ∈ {0,1} 8 ( Figure 2(b) ). The differences between [ Thanks to the simplicity of the distribution of the subkey of Piccolo, the two differential paths do not share any active state. Fortunately, it is so easy to verify that ( ) [ , ] → is always true for all , ∈ {0, 1}
8 . Up to now, for each key group, we get a corresponding 8-dimensional biclique structure as discussed above.
From Figure 2 , we find a weakness in the key schedule of Piccolo-80; that is, [4] Figure 3) . The choice is made according to the total number of F-Function and an effective filtering of the wrong keys. Next, we calculate these matching variates in both directions in order to obtain the accurate key. ← . Because of the same beginning, the key differences between [0, ] and [ , ] can cause the computational complexity. On Figure 3(b) , the gray bytes are active and the white bytes need not be computed. [ , ] can influence the computational complexity. On Figure 3(a) , the gray bytes are active and the white bytes need not be computed.
Search Candidates. In the last session of the attack, the adversary verifies the rest candidate key by the equality of → , and ← , for all , ∈ {0, 1} 8 in each group exhaustively, until the right key is discovered. (Table 3) , an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 7 rounds is constructed by each left half of [6] and [7] , that is, [6] and [7] . The computational complexity of this structure is less than others' .
Biclique Cryptanalysis of
Similar to Piccolo-80, the keys
and
[ , ] of each group are depicted, as shown below:
where ∈ {0, 1} 8 , = 0 00, 
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Is computed once Is computed 2 8 times 
Thus, the key space of K is divided into 2 112 groups of 2 16 keys each.
Phase 2: 8-Dimensional Biclique Structure of 7 Rounds.
We construct an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 7 rounds for Piccolo-128 for each group (Figure 4) . Here, is subciphers for round 24∼30 and −1 is the inverse of . The process of calculating the ciphertexts and intermediate states consists of the following 3 steps.
Step 1. Let 0 = 0 (64) and decrypt 0 for 7 rounds to obtain 0 (Figure 4(a) ); that is, 0 =
Step 2. Encrypt 0 using different keys [ ,0] for ∈ {0, 1} Step 3. Decrypt 0 using different keys [0, ] for ∈ {0, 1} → ( ) has been constructed.
Thanks to the simplicity of the distribution of the subkey of Piccolo-128, it is also very easy to verify that ( ) [ , ] → is always true for all , ∈ {0, 1}
8 . Up to now, for each key group, we get a corresponding 8-dimensional biclique structure. Figure 5) . Next, we calculate these matching variates in both directions in order to obtain the right key. ← . After that, is decrypted using all the possible 2 − 1 keys
Phase 3: Meeting in the
← . On Figure 5 (b), the gray bytes are active and the white bytes do not need to be computed.
Forward Direction. Firstly, we decrypt the ciphertexts for ∈ {0, 1} 8 to obtain 2 8 plaintexts . Secondly, each is encrypted under the key [ ,0 ] to obtain
. Then, is encrypted using all the possible 2 − 1 keys [ , ] to get [ , ] → → , . On Figure 5 (a), the gray bytes are active and the white bytes do not need to be computed. Search Candidates. In the last session of the attack, the adversary verifies the equality of → , and ← , for all , ∈ {0, 1} 8 to discover the correct key. . Similar to Section 3.3, we construct an 8-dimensional biclique structure of 5 rounds (26∼30) for Piccolo-128 by each left half of [6] and [2] , that is, [6] and [2] (Figure 6 ). In the phase of meeting in the middle over 26 rounds, we select a 16-bit internal state ( = [15] . Jeong et al. applied biclique cryptanalysis to the lightweight block ciphers LED, Piccolo, and PRESENT in [15] . They used the concept of independent-biclique which included constructing biclique structure by independent related-key differentials and matching with precomputations. They found a limited and slow diffusion of the subkey distribution and encryption process. As a result, their attacks can discover the master key with computational complexities superior to an exhaustive search. However, we find two faults of their biclique cryptanalysis of Piccolo as follows:
Another Biclique Cryptanalysis of
Complexities
Comments on the Result of
(1) Jeong et al. found that [4] and [2] gave the construction of an 8-dimensional biclique which was shown in Figure 10 of [15] . The Δ -differential affected only 6 bytes [3] , and [3] ) which is drawn on Figure 7 (a) (including the grid line byte) in this paper. As a result, the data complexity does not go beyond 2 48 .
In the attack shown in Figure 7 , it is clear that the left half of the round key rk 46 can offset the left half of WK 2 (the postwhitening key); that is, there is no difference in the grid line byte ( Similarly, 3 bytes but not one byte are active in the decryption of 22nd round in backward direction for Piccolo-128 of recomputation and they are shown in Figure 13 of [15] .
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Complexities of Biclique Cryptanalysis on Piccolo-80
4.2.1. Data Complexity. By analyzing the key schedule, we find a weakness in the key schedule on Piccolo-80; that is, the round key rk 47 can offset the postwhitening key partially (see Figure 2 ). Based on this, the data complexity can be reduced greatly.
The amount of ciphertexts to be decrypted dominates the data complexity (Figure 2 ). For each biclique structure, let 0 = 0 (64) . All the ciphertexts share the equal values in 3 bytes ( [0], [4] , and [5] , i.e., white bytes), so the data complexity does not go beyond 2 40 . Matching Complexity. In forward direction, the differences between [ ,0] and [ , ] dominate the computational complexity. On Figure 3( [4] , [5] , [6] , and [7] , i.e., white bytes), so the data complexity does not go beyond 2 24 (See Figure 4) . [1] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , and [7] , i.e., white bytes), so the data complexity does not go beyond 2 8 (See Figure 6 ). 
Computational
Conclusion
Designers have given several attacks including linear cryptanalysis, impossible differential cryptanalysis, and MITM attack on security analysis for Piccolo. The best result was 3-subset MITM attacks on 14/21-round Piccolo-80/128 without the whitening key. The previous results and our results are summarized on Piccolo in Tables 1 and 2 . Some results did not include whitening key; some attacks were reduced-round. However, our results are full round Piccolo-80/128. By analyzing the distribution of the subkey and the structure of encryption, we find two faults of the results in [15] and a weakness in the key schedule on Piccolo-80. The two faults are depicted in Section 4.1. The weakness on Piccolo-80 is that the right half of the round key rk 47 can offset the right half of the postwhitening key WK 3 (Figure 2(c) ). Based on this, the data complexity can be decreased greatly.
We use biclique cryptanalysis to recover the master key for the full round Piccolo-80 with a 6-round biclique and the full round Piccolo-128 with a 7-round biclique, respectively. The attacks require data complexity of 2 40 and 2 24 chosen ciphertexts and computational complexity of 2
79.22
and 2 127.14 , respectively. These results are superior to other biclique cryptanalytic results on Piccolo.
This result is that the biclique technology can attack some ciphers with simple key schedule and slow diffusion. So, the designers of lightweight ciphers need to consider not only the implementation efficiency, but also key schedule complexity and diffusion speed.
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